THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE OUTLOOK

By the Editor.

'WATCHMAN, what of the night?' is an ancient question, and it received something of a duplex answer when asked by the Hebrew prophet, as such a question must when put to conscientious persons who are not omniscient. It is, however, a question which we may not inappropriately put to ourselves as the *Modern Churchman* enters on its fourteenth year. If by the question, Watchman, what of the night? is meant, Watchman, what of the Church of England? we may reply succinctly in the words of Bishop Henson: 'The English people is no longer interested as it once was in the English Church.' Yet let it not be supposed that the English Church is peculiar in this respect. A judicious observer has recently said: 'The Church of England was supposed to have a hold on the aristocracy, the Congregational Churches on the middle class, and the Methodists on the working class, but now no Church seems to have any real hold on any class.'[1] That is the most significant fact in the present religious situation in England. There is a steadily increasing number of the population who are ceasing to regard the Christian Church seriously, yet they do not regard her unkindly—their attitude is mainly one of indifference. They do not think of her as their fathers did, as the gate to heaven, neither do they regard her as an indispensable social institution. Why is this? Frankly, because she

[1] T. Tiplady: *The Church and the Outsider.*

is becoming discredited. When to-day neither individuals nor institutions can rely any longer on an appeal to prerogatives of supernatural origin, there are two qualities indispensable for those who would inspire confidence as leaders—intelligence and courage. The Church seems, owing to her unrevised Prayer Book, the misunderstandings created by her use of the Old Testament, the increasing cult of mediaeval superstitions by many of her clergy, to be lacking in intelligence. Our more ardent social reformers and great masses of the labouring classes believe she has been much too complacent in the face of social injustice and grinding poverty, and they attribute this complacency to lack of moral courage. To this it is not due in most cases, but to inability to discover the real remedy for many of our social ills and economic injustices. Possibly this month's C.O.P.E.C. discussions at Birmingham will clear up the issues for our Church leaders and unite them in a clear-headed and courageous social and economic policy. If that be so the charge of cowardice will be for the most part removed, and even if men do not henceforth regard the Church as a sure guide to the next world, they will at least value her as a very useful social adjunct in this.

But there is that question of the spiritual world—the world of eternal verities—and of the Church's relation to it. That world has ceased to be real for an increasing number of our population. That is not because they are more materialist than their fathers, but because the Church, instead of witnessing to eternal truths, seems in too many cases to be an exponent of outworn and impossible theologies and a promoter of petty pieties. It is a terrible thing to say, but much of the Church's teaching is not only not helping Christian faith, it is actually hindering it. Who can say for how much unbelief *Hymns Ancient and Modern*, the *Quicunque Vult*, our unrevised Baptismal and Burial Services are responsible? Who can say how much the mediaeval superstitions and doctrines sedulously propagated by an increasing number of our clergy are responsible for the nation's loss of conviction in the reality of an eternal world? And that brings us to the real cause of the declining influence of the Church. It is to be found in the declining quality of her clergy. No one desires to emphasize this, and

yet no one can fail to observe it. Intellectually and socially, and that really means personally, the clergy are losing weight with the nation. For some time past the Church's system would appear to have been extraordinarily successful in screening out the large men and letting the small men into Holy Orders. Men of courage and enterprise, men of vigorous, independent natures and original minds who have a desire to advance the Kingdom of God are repelled, it may be by the mental limitations involved, or the ecclesiastical conventions required, from seeking Holy Orders. Others are even definitely discouraged by the ecclesiastical authorities. The noblest and most attractive missionary the writer of this article ever met, was unable to get Orders from the only bishop he approached on the subject. The bishop believed him—he was a doctor of medicine—to be unsound theologically. The writer also heard Grenfell of Labrador say that one of his best workers was an ex-theological student who had failed to get ordained owing to heresy, although he (Grenfell of Labrador) had often heard him preaching and teaching, but had failed to detect what the heresy was. These are examples of what in an age of intellectual doubt, amid the clash of traditional dogma with advancing science, has been taking place in a large number of cases. The Church is now waking up to find that she is getting short-handed, and we must also add weak-handed, for while the larger men find their vocation in politics, and education, and medicine, and commerce, it is for the most part only the little men who creep into curacies. Mr. Roland Allen's plan[2] of ordaining middle-aged men engaged in professions and business to serve as honorary and half-time clergymen has much to be said for it, if only on the plea that it would make our ministry more laic and less clericalist than it is at present. But Mr. Allen's remedy, if adopted, which is improbable, would be inadequate. We must have a body of large-minded, great-hearted, and well-trained men to serve in a whole-time ministry. With such a ministry much, if not all, the weakness of the English Church would disappear. But how to win these men to give their lives to serve in a declining Church with an unrevised Prayer Book and an antiquated theology is the problem. We hope our

[2] See *Voluntary Clergy*, pubd. by S.P.C.K. Price, 2/6

newly-appointed Archbishops' Committee will discover the remedy, and that it will not merely take the form of demanding larger sums from the laity for the training and payment of the clergy. However, until the right remedy is found for these evils the reply to the question: Watchman, what of the night? is, so far as the Church of England is concerned: 'The night is dark and must become darker.'

If the question, Watchman, what of the night? means Watchman, what of Modernism? the answer is, 'The dawn cometh.' Modernism, it is true, is not making much headway in the sphere of 'the London, Brighton and South Coast Religion'; that is where our Jesuit friends are advancing. This, however, so far as the future of mankind is concerned, matters little. The 'London, Brighton and South Coast Religion' is the religion of decadents and reactionaries. Into other spheres, where there is more vitality and vigour, Modernism is steadily penetrating. Readers of the *Modern Churchman* do not need to be informed of what is taking place in the United States. Whether Modernists there are to have their right recognized to be members and ministers of various American Churches, or whether they are to be ejected or suppressed, is still in the balance. If ejection and suppression be the portion of American Modernists, then the American Churches are simply destroying their future powers of expansion, and the Spirit of Christ will henceforth find its dwelling place not in American ecclesiastical organizations, but in the educational and philanthropic institutions of American Democracy.

If we pass from America to the vast Mission Field of the Far East, whether in China or in India or Japan, the Spirit of Modernism is seen steadily permeating the various missionary educational centres.

We recently received a request from China that articles in the *Modern Churchman* might be translated into Chinese. That is a very small matter, yet it is not without significance. There is no doubt that the Christianity of these great empires will not be that of the Roman Empire, nor even that of the Protestant Reformation. The dream that the Christianity of the East will be moulded by the ancient philosophical and religious systems of Asia is merely a passing product of Oriental nationalist

aspirations. With the advance of education it will be in the best and truest sense Modernist.

The Spirit of Modernism is manifestly stirring in China when a responsible missionary like the Rev. J. D. MacRae, M.D., B.D., Dean of the School of Theology at Shantung Christian University, can write in *The Chinese Recorder* as follows:

> 'At the risk of being branded as a cheap critic of organised Christianity one feels compelled to state that our present-day Christianity in China, with conspicuous exceptions, tends to become too ecclesiastical and institutional. It curbs spontaneity; it tries the spirits, not so much to know whether they be of *God* as to know whether they be of *us*. Yet God has not given credentials of universality to clerical orders, ecclesiastical institutions, denominational confessions or even theological curricula made in the West. . . . We dare not force the pace. Yet the first stage is without doubt, a fresh interpretation of the whole message of Jesus. He must be seen anew through the eyes of China.
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> 'The Religion of Jesus Christ is before all a life, an expanding life, which has in it power to adapt itself to every new occasion and can solve potentially every problem of life with which it may be confronted. "In Him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." *Let us demand for the Chinese Church the right of free experiment in every sphere which religion touches.* Nothing less will satisfy the mind and heart of young China. Only so can China make her contribution to the world's interpretation of the Christian Religion.' (pp. 82—83.)

And what Dr. MacRae says of China we know is equally true of Japan and India. In India and Ceylon the Modernist spirit is closely bound up with nationalist and anti-British feeling, but that is a temporary phase. *The Indian Patriot*, ably edited by a Christian Indian, has an open-minded, forward-glancing way of treating Christian problems and policies (even though this involves excruciating wrestlings with English idioms) which is full of promise for the future.

If we pass over into the world of current theological and religious literature, the situation is also full of hope. Except for a few manuals and books of devotion on Traditionalist lines and a small number of controversial attacks on Modernism, such as a recent series of University sermons delivered in a church round whose graceful spire 'the magic of the Middle Ages' still lingers, although its undergraduate congregation has

[3] February, 1924. J. D. Macrae, Vol. lv. No. 2, p. 8.

departed, the whole output is permeated by the Spirit of Modernism. Some of its authors boldly take a Modernist line and avow it; others adopt Modernist methods and Modernist conclusions, but wisely avoid the term; but the subtlest of all expound Modernist views, and cover their tracks by saying various harsh things of Modernists and Modernism, somewhat like the notable Samuel Weller (junior) who, dining with his fellow-flunkies at Bath, raised himself in their estimation by calling the waiter a 'desp'rate willin'.' It is an old device of poor human nature—*facile decipiens facilius decepta.* Roman history relates that M. Livius Drusus, tribune of the plebs, having vetoed the democratic reforms proposed by Gracchus, brought forward almost the very same measures, in order to gain popularity for the senate, and to impress the people with the belief that the *optimates* were their best friends. The success of this manœuvre gained for him the title *patronus senatus.* It is not at all outside the bounds of possibility that the Church historians of the future will describe our crypto-Modernists of to-day as the saviours of the Church, because they induced the rank and file of the orthodox to become Modernist without their knowing it.

St. Paul declared that he rejoiced and would rejoice, whether Christ were preached in pretence or in truth—εἴτε προφάσει εἴτε ἀληθείᾳ[4]—and Modernists must learn to rejoice also, even if, when their ideals are adopted and their methods are used, they themselves are condemned.

[4] *Phil.* I, 18.

NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE IDEA OF GOD

By J. C. HARDWICK, M.A., B.Sc., Author of *Science and Religion from Galileo to Bergson.*

WHAT room does science leave for God? asks Mr. Julian Huxley in his *Essays of a Biologist* (p. 235). The question scarcely admits of a simple reply; yet the inquiry presses, if only because the importance and value of religion are widely admitted even in scientific circles.

The situation appears to be that a number of people to-day are inclined to believe in religion who find themselves unable, for one reason or another, to believe in God—at least in the traditional sense. They are tempted to ask whether this belief is any longer necessary for religion. May it not be a belief belonging to a comparatively infantile stage in human religious development, to be discarded as man rises to mental and moral maturity? Is it not now a hindrance rather than a help to religion?

Mr. Huxley holds that an idea of God is by no means useless to religion, nor is such an idea rendered impossible by the results of the natural sciences:

> 'Although much alteration and a thorough revision of ideas is needed, the term *God* has an important scientific connotation; and further, the present stagnation of religion can be remedied if, as has happened again and again, in biological evolution, the old forms become extinct or subordinate, and a new dominant type is developed along quite fresh lines.'

According to this view, the idea of God is far from being useless or harmful to religion; on the contrary, religion is at present suffering because the ideas of God current in religious circles are inadequate and unsatisfying. If this be true, hopes may be entertained of religion experiencing a revival, that is if new ideas of God were introduced. It is important to recognize, however, exactly where the older ideas of God are failing to satisfy the needs of to-day.

It has been well observed that it is not any particular discovery or series of discoveries in any of the natural sciences that has discredited traditional ideas of God. Although the

body of scientific knowledge has been expanded and transformed, that is not the most important feature of the situation. What is of far deeper significance is *an entirely new attitude of mind*, now almost universal, affecting as it does large numbers of people of very varying degrees of education. A fresh mental atmosphere has been created by a general, if somewhat vague, appreciation of the results of the scientific method. That this psychological change should have come about gradually, and even unconsciously, increases rather than diminishes its chances of being permanent. We are now faced by an attitude which, in its way, is as stubborn and obstinate as the old religious prejudices which it has replaced.

What has gone, certainly for the present, and perhaps for ever, is an idea of God based on a certain theory of divine action—the idea of a God interfering from outside. Between this idea and the principles and methods of the natural sciences there exists the most direct opposition. What is known as the scientific method is based on the belief that there exist certain regularities of behaviour among phenomena, which regularities can be discovered by observation and experiment, and summed up in formulae or 'laws.' In conflict with this stands the idea of a God interfering from outside, or the idea of 'miracle,' for it introduces an incalculable factor of irregularity which stultifies calculation and prediction, and renders any approach to scientific accuracy impossible. The opposition between these two principles is perhaps most prominent in the region of scientific history; for while the scientific historian attempts to interpret the past in terms of those psychological or social laws which his science has formulated, the 'religious,' or non-scientific, historian attempts to introduce certain factors of another order, which render a strictly scientific interpretation impossible.

To deviate into the byway opened up by the word 'miracle' would involve us in a lengthy discussion, but it is perhaps permissible, at this point, to devote a few lines to the dissipation of an illusion. It is often said by exponents of the traditional view of miracle that while the results of the physical sciences have tended to discredit that view, yet that it is being rehabilitated, in some of its former security of tenure, by the biological,

and still more by the psychological, sciences.[1] Few biologists, however, and still fewer psychologists, would lend their authority to this contention. Their twin sciences, like the older science of physics, are based on the same principle, *i.e.* that regularities of behaviour are everywhere discoverable. These regularities are, in fact, being established, and not least where popular thought regarded it as impossible that they should exist. It is true that psychology, being the youngest of the sciences, besides being concerned with the most complex subject-matter of all the sciences, is engaged in the search rather than standing amidst the completed discovery, of such regularities of behaviour. Nevertheless, such regularities are everywhere being established and being summed up in 'laws,' so that we may look forward confidently to a time when psychological phenomena will provide as few gaps for the interposition of unknown factors as physical phenomena now appear to do. There will be as little room for 'miracle' in psychology as there now is in physics or chemistry.

This, however, is a side-issue; or rather it is an attempt to close up a promising side-alley down which controversialists are apt to slip away. But the avenue is a *cul-de-sac*, and leads nowhere. The important point is that in this controversy between 'miracle' and natural science, there is no room for compromise; it is one of the few cases where 'the either—or fallacy' is not a fallacy, but a sober canon of reasoning.

There is, indeed, another side-issue, which leads not to a *cul-de-sac*, but actually over a precipice. We refer to the attempt, to which Lord Balfour, in his *Philosophic Doubt*, lent his authority, to discredit the methods and results of the natural sciences. A discussion of this problem involves questions of epistemology, *i.e.* of the methods and value of human knowledge and of the nature of truth. We have no intention of entering that labyrinth. All we can say is that scientific method seems to be sanctioned by its results: it explains, and its explanations turn out to have been right; it predicts, and its predictions turn out to be true. To abandon these *criteria* will

[1] This vein has been industriously worked by Canon Peter Green, of Manchester, a writer whose earnest sincerity and social idealism we admire, but whose lack of acquaintance with scientific method, and even of the results of that method, we cannot ignore.

lead us nowhere, save into an abyss—the abyss of complete scepticism. Yet even scepticism, for the hard-pressed Traditionalist, has sometimes proved an attractive refuge. As has been truly said, 'To believe nothing is to believe everything,' and where there are no standards of truth, all things, even the impossible, are possible. We live in a topsy-turvy world, a Chestertonian heaven, where nothing is ruled out but the rational and the expected, and only the reasonable is untrue.

Having closed up these two side-alleys, we may return to the proposition that the natural sciences have generated, whether we like it or not, an atmosphere definitely hostile to traditional ideas of a God working from outside—in short, to traditional ideas of 'miracle.' And as we are dealing with the mentality of the general public, it should be added that this movement away from the traditional view of miracle and of divine action, though begun by the forces above-mentioned, has been accelerated by the late war. At that time a strong psychological need for miracle was felt, but not satisfied. The question became pertinent whether a God who, to add to the enjoyment of the wedding guests, could change water into wine, and yet did not avert a horrible death from many a mother's 'child of many prayers,' was, after all, a God to be worshipped—or even believed in.

Thus there is a good deal to be said for Mr. Julian Huxley's diagnosis of our religious, or non-religious *malaise*, *i.e.* that our religious notions, and in particular our ideas of God, require a thorough overhaul. It still remains, of course, an open question whether, or how far, the idea of God which Mr. Huxley recommends to us will prove a satisfying substitute for traditional ideas. There is, at any rate, this to be said for his proposals, that they constitute an honest attempt to preserve religious ideals without sacrificing the claims of scientific truth. It may, indeed, be regarded as an act of faith to suppose that the two can ever be reconciled—an act of faith of which Traditionalists and Secularists seem to be alike incapable.

According to Mr. Huxley, God is equivalent to the universe; yet not to the universe in itself, but only so far as it has been grasped as a whole by a mind, embodied in an idea, and in consequence capable of influencing that mind (p. 265). The

idea of God is an idea under which the universe is regarded as an unity. From regarding a thing as an unity, it is only one step to regard it as a personality; and if our idea of God included the idea of personality, Mr. Huxley would, for his part, raise no objections. On the contrary, 'by organizing our knowledge of outer reality after the pattern of a personality,' we may enter into relations with it of a sort which, if we organized it under a different system of ideas, would be out of the question. To regard the universe as personal is to render possible an attainment to 'a sense of interpenetration with the reality around us.'

Mr. Huxley, however, having studied the psychology of religion, is well aware that the religious consciousness is concerned less with the external universe than with the world of inner experience; and he sees that there should be something in religion to provide an internal harmony corresponding to the external harmony or unity discoverable in the external universe and expressed, for purposes of religious thought and practice, under the idea of God. Religion should provide means for bringing all the various activities and experiences of life into a true organization—in a word, to produce 'inward peace,' or to unify the personality. Thus the religious problem from this (the practical) point of view is a psychological problem, though it may not be envisaged as such even by those who, like St. Paul, have arrived at a solution of it. Yet his doctrine of 'grace' was nothing more nor less than the discovery of an harmonizing principle, according to which 'whatever one does is in a sense right, because one's desires are all subordinate to a desire for right, and to something which is right . . . one's life is liberated to free activity, one's energy made all available for achievement.' St. Paul's language is naturally less general and abstract, but his experience might have been expressed in some such formula as the above. After all, the formulae are irrelevant, it is the experience that matters.

One difficulty oppresses the modern man which was not felt, or not felt to the same extent, in a pre-scientific epoch. This is that the universe as we envisage it seems to contradict, or render fantastic, those ideals which we inwardly cherish; so that even the man who has reduced his internal life to harmony

is faced with a disharmony between the ideals of that internal life, and the brute facts of the material world. What we know of the universe appears not to sanction those moral and spiritual ideals which must be satisfied and guaranteed if we are to have a real unity of heart and mind, a true internal harmony. T. H. Huxley elaborated this theme in his well-known Romanes Lecture. And if his thesis be a sound one, it is quite hopeless to attempt to organize the universe under any unifying idea which could, by any stretch of language, be called an idea of God. If T. H. Huxley was right, the idea of God must go; because the universe is not God, but the devil—it is Man who is God.

Now, it is highly interesting to observe that Mr. Julian Huxley joins issue with his distinguished forerunner on precisely this point. He sees that if 'God' is going to be in any sense equivalent to the universe (or the idea of God to an idea of the universe), it must be an *universe that guarantees our ideals*. The universe must be friendly, or we cannot worship it, or any idea of it, in any shape or form. And Mr. Huxley quite clearly expresses the belief that the universe *does* sanction our ideals or values—such, at any rate, is the conclusion to which the results of the natural sciences, especially of biology and psychology, seem to lead him.

In the first place he holds that 'there has been a main direction in evolution,' and the tendency has been to produce 'an increasing intensity of qualities which we are unanimous in calling valuable.' In other words, 'the application of our scale of values tends in the same direction as has the march of evolutionary history'; so that we are justified in calling this direction progressive, and indeed are 'logically compelled to give to motion in this direction a name which, like progress, implies the idea of value' (p. 27). Thus it is perfectly legitimate to speak of a law of progress in evolution.

It is worth observing that Mr. Huxley declines to introduce the conception of 'purpose' to explain the evolutionary process.

> '"Purpose" is a term invented to denote a particular operation of the human mind, and should only be used where a psychological basis may reasonably be postulated.'

The question is far too large to be treated here; and perhaps it is merely a survival of old ideas to talk of purpose or

design at all in this connection. What we are concerned with is the actual production, existence, and survival of values, whether they were 'purposed' or not seems a purely academic question.

> 'What is important is that the human idea of *value* finds its external counterpart in an actual historical direction in phenomena, and that each becomes more important because of the relationship.'

The evolutionary optimism advocated by Mr. Julian Huxley contrasts strongly with T. H. Huxley's views. Yet the more recent writer has the advantage of another generation's patient pondering over this question. The contrast between human ideals and the cosmic process, which seemed so absolute to Professor Huxley, seems to his successor a natural contrast between two different stages of a process of development co-existing in time and place. Or, as he prefers to put it (to avoid representing as static what is really fluid), the difference is one of pace:

> 'Two things may be moving in the same direction, and, if one be moving much slower than the other, the slower may impede the faster; a pedestrian procession making eastward along Fleet Street will hold up the life of the city for a time, and cows walking along railways are treated as obstacles by trains proceeding in the same direction.'

Of course, T. H. Huxley had in mind a background that preceded, and will survive, the biological evolutionary process itself; *e.g.* the non-living material universe. Our planet will, according to this view, one day be a dead world, and all our ideals be as if they had never been: humanity and its aspirations will be lost in the eternal silence, and be neither forgotten nor remembered in a world where mind no longer exists.

Mr. Julian Huxley's reply to this may seem speculative, but may also turn out to have been justified. He points out that while in physics and chemistry we see a tendency towards the extinction of life and activity, in biology we see a tendency towards more life and more activity; and the question arises whether

> 'It is not possible that the evolving mind, of whose achievements in its new level in man we are only seeing the beginning, may continue to find more and more ways of subordinating the inorganic to itself, and that it may eventually retard or even prevent the attainment of the complete degradation of energy prophesied by physico-chemical science? Is it not possible that this great generalisation only applies to phenomena in their purely material aspect, and that when we

> learn to detect and measure the mental aspects of phenomena we may find reason to modify the universal applicability of this law of degradation? We do not know the answer to that question: but it is clearly a legitimate and useful question to ask' (p. 73).

This suggestion that there are two chief directions in the universe, one towards the degradation of all energy and activity, and another towards their heightening and elaboration has been made, in a rather different form, by Bergson, and it would be premature to exclude the possibility of such a suggestion being true.

We have, in the above remarks, only dealt with certain leading features of Mr. Julian Huxley's attitude; those who wish for further information should explore the writings of this philosophical biologist for themselves. Sufficient has perhaps been said, however, to show that the more or less hostile attitude adopted by biologists towards religion a generation or so back has now been replaced by something very different.

Yet at the same time we should not feed our imagination on hopes that are vain; although religion may be understood and appreciated—and even genuinely experienced—by these younger men of science, signs are altogether wanting of any movement on their part back towards traditional ideas of divine action. Though they would be the first to admit that the universe is a very wonderful place, only partially explored, and full of extensive possibilities of various kinds, there is one thing they will not admit—that phenomena are incapable of being expressed in terms of natural law. Regularities of behaviour are, in their view, everywhere discoverable, and not least where they have not yet been discovered. The right formula, or 'law,' may not in every case—perhaps not in the majority of cases—yet have been found; but the process, though long, is sure, and the result certain. For 'miracle' in the traditional sense, the 'universe of discourse' of the philosophically-minded man of science has no room whatever. Does this fact eliminate the possibility of a *concordat* between Christianity and the spirit of the natural sciences? That is the point, and that is also the problem. Probably the next thirty years will see it solved—and solved for good. It is undoubtedly the most important problem facing an age not unbeset by issues of the gravest kind.

LE PÈRE HYACINTHE

By the Rev. ALFRED FAWKES, M.A., author of *Studies in Modernism.*

M. HOUTIN is the Tillemont of Modernism; and the seventeen volumes which we owe to his industry are *Mémoires pour servir* for the Church history of his time. He adopts Tillemont's method of associating the record of events with the biographies of eminent Churchmen. The two volumes of *La Question Biblique* are elaborately documented from first-hand sources; *Evêques et diocèses* gives us studies of the personnel of the French Church under two long and memorable Pontificates; the *Crise du clergé* and the *Histoire du Modernisme Catholique* are indispensable to the student of the present religious situation among Catholics; in the three works containing the *Life and Letters of Père Hyacinthe*[1] we have a series of life-like portraits of the subject of the biography, and of many of the distinguished persons with whom he was brought into contact during his long and chequered career. These important books should be better known in England than they are. Every educated man reads French; and religious and ecclesiastical questions are more discussed here than in France, where indifference on the one hand, and the pressure of the *Union sacrée* on the other, make their adequate treatment impossible. The two, Pilate and Caiaphas, play into one another's hands. As the recent Brassac case shows, the Church tolerates no departure from tradition: while, to quote Buckle:

> 'Men who reject the fundamental truths of religion will care little for the extent to which these truths are perverted. All the idolatry, all the ceremonial, all the dogmas and all the traditions by which religion is retarded will give them no disquietude, because they consider the opinions that are checked to be equally false with those that are favoured. Why should those to whom transcendental truths are unknown labour to remove the superstitions which darken those truths? Such a generation, so far from attacking ecclesiastical usurpations, would rather look at the clergy as convenient tools to ensnare the ignorant and to control the vulgar."

[1] (1) *Le Père Hyacinthe dans l'Eglise romaine,* 1827—1869, 9 francs. (2) *Le Père Hyacinthe, Réformateur Catholique,* 1869—1893, 8 francs. (3) *Le Père Hyacinthe, Prêtre Solitaire,* 1893—1912, 9 francs. (Paris: Emile Nonrry.)

Speaking to Mgr. Mignot, Leo XIII expressed his fear of a schism in France. The Archbishop reassured him: no one, he said, in France cared enough for religion to make one. A reformation presupposes faith.

The three volumes which may be called the Trilogy of Père Hyacinthe are eminently readable, and have exceptional documentary value: the frankness with which the great preacher's journal gives expression both to his own sentiments and those of his friends and correspondents is extreme. The unity of the Roman Church is not, it would appear, what its Anglican admirers think it. By many Catholics the Papacy and the Curia are viewed with profound misgiving and aversion. '*Ils veulent gouverner l'Eglise comme une boutique*,' says one Bishop; another complains that he and his colleagues are driven by Propaganda 'like a herd of swine.' A third, speaking of the Vatican Council: '*leur dogme ne sera jamais qu'un dogme inepte, et leur concile un concile de sacristains*.' Hyacinthe was not a Modernist: he had neither the temperament nor the attainments of a scholar; the questions raised by Modernism had little or no meaning for him; he was of an earlier age. He was a Liberal Catholic of the type of Montalembert and Dupanloup—at a distance: his breach with the Church took place before the definition of 1870; and it is not easy to see why it came about as and when it did. It was rather instinctive than reasoned. The situation was strained—Ward's *Life of Newman* shows the acuteness of the tension; and he was out of touch with official Catholicism. But he had all along been so; and nothing new had taken place. He was a born orator; and like most preachers of the oratorical sort—Father Burke, the Irish Dominican, is an example—his sermons were better to hear than to read. The then Archbishop of Paris, Mgr. Darboy, the martyr of the Commune, whose sympathies were liberal, brought him forward. The *Conférences* filled Notre Dame; and the living touch which he communicated to that famous pulpit attracted men of letters, politicians, publicists, who heard and wondered whether the vision of the dry bones was to be repeated. He voiced the general opposition to the obscurantism of the Papacy and the secular policy of the Roman Curia. There was nothing new in his protest; what was

new was that it came not from without the Church—here it was universal—but from within. In the later years of Pius IX there was a widespread feeling among wise and good men that Christ slept in Peter's boat, and that the excess of intellectual and moral evil in the Church had become self-destructive; the Gadarene swine were heading for the precipice; in the nature of things a change must come. We have seen the same passionate conviction in the Modernism of our own generation. The Papal Church is a mixed magnitude. 'I will not face,' says Father Tyrrell, 'because I can so hardly resist, the impression that the rich and varied experience in good and evil of so notable a section of humanity as has been gathered within its walls is to be as water poured out on the ground, or as a column of vapour dispersed in the broad air. I cannot, or at least I will not, believe that the persecuted minority, who in every generation have striven loyally against the overwhelming forces of ecclesiastical corruption and abuse, have laboured in vain, or that we shall never reap in joy the harvest they have sown in tears.' The words have a wider range: there is a sense in which we are in the same condemnation. But they were written of, and apply more obviously to, the Roman than to any other communion. What is the fatal canker in this great Church which makes its barrenness incurable? 'Give them, O Lord; what wilt thou give? Give them a miscarrying womb, and dry breasts.'

Nor, had reform been possible, was Hyacinthe cast for the rôle of a reformer? He had been acclaimed as a prophet, and took to the part too kindly. He repudiated the infallibility of the Pope, but accepted his own and that of the American lady who afterwards became Mme. Loyson: he had the defects as well as the qualities of a popular preacher; he was self-opinionated, unstable, inconsequent, and vain. He was curiously destitute of judgment or knowledge of the world. '*Vous êtes très enfant*,' Montalembert wrote to him. '*Vous ne connaissez pas, assez les hommes. Quand on vous voit écrire à les gens tels que M. de Villa-Marina et M. de Girardin cela fait sourire vos ennemis, et cela attriste une fois de plus vos amis.*' He spoke and wrote too much and too unguardedly. However good his case against it, an individual who comes into conflict with an institution, secular or religious, is at a dis-

advantage. The smallest error in taste, temper, or tactics, on his part is taken advantage of; his opponents are watchful and not over scrupulous; they carry the heavier guns. 'Come ye out from among them, and be ye separate,' says the Scripture. But it does not bid us write to the papers about it; and we shall have reason to regret it if we do. Hyacinthe insisted on publicity. He got it; but in doing so he gave the other side every conceivable handle against him: the price he paid for his imprudence was the ineffectualness of his later years. He was, in fact, his own worst enemy. No one who knew him questioned his real goodness; it was this that enabled him to retain the friendship of such men as the saintly Abbé Huvelin, Mgr. Mignot, and Mgr. Lacroix. But he must often have been a great trial to his friends!

From the first his relations with the lady who afterwards became his wife were regrettable, and his marriage was in every way illjudged. It was a saying of a shrewd observer, the late Father Sammons, that 'the priests who marry have their purgatory in this world.' There are, no doubt, exceptions; but it is what one would expect. No serious person can attach any religious force or moral value to a vow of or engagement to celibacy; the results of putting the clergy and the religious orders under this supposed obligation might have been foreseen, and are written large in history: it would have been a miracle were they other than they are. The obliquity of vision which leads certain Anglicans to question this is phenomenal: such persons are not to be reasoned with; we look, and pass on. But it is, to say the least of it, highly probable that a seminary trained priest who uses his undoubted right to marry—*cf.* Article xxxii—will marry unwisely. The note of his past has been segregation; he is ignorant of the world, of life, of men, and in particular of women—any knowledge of them that he has is abstract, pathological and useless for practical purposes. He has escaped from the net of the fowler. But there are many nets and many fowlers: he does well to walk carefully, to learn how to use his freedom. In particular, a prophet who takes a prophetess to wife courts trouble. For prophets are 'kittle cattle,' and ill to deal with; when their prophecies are discordant, one or other goes to the wall. What says the Son of

Sirach? 'As the climbing of a sandy way to the feet of the aged, so is a woman full of tongue to a quiet man.' And in France a '*réformateur catholique*' who marries is not taken seriously: the ex-Carmelite's marriage closed his career.

The record of his last years is melancholy reading. He attempts to found a Church—'National Catholic' at Geneva, 'Catholic Gallican' at Paris: the result in each case was what might have been expected. Mme. Loyson developed sympathies with Mohammedanism; her husband lectured at Cairo and Alexandria on the desirability of a union between Christianity and Islam. He went to Jerusalem, where he 'fraternized with all the religions,' Christian and non-Christian, Turkish and Jewish. He communicated with Armenians and Copts—the Orthodox Greeks held aloof from him; he held conferences or 'conversations,' with imams, muftis, and cadis: he enthused, under the influence of Mme. Loyson, over the Prophet; '*le christianisme* (she said) *sera bien bas que l'isamisme sera encore ferme.*' What, people wondered, was the religion of this strange couple? At one time it was said that he had become a Mussulman, at another a Copt. '*Naturellment,*' says M. Houtin, '*tout comme à Paris, le Père écrivit aux journaux pour expliquer ses sentiments.*' Silence would have been golden. But this was a lesson which *le Père* never learned.

Being of the opinion of the *Church Times*, that a union of religions would be incomplete unless the Church of Rome was included, Mme. Loyson undertook the pilgrimage *ad limina* (1893), and applied for an audience with Leo XIII. '*Elle croyait avoir jusque-là tenu tête au pape; elle pensait qu'elle pourrait bien le convertir.*' The Pope did not see his way to a personal interview: but she succeeded in making her Easter communion in the Vatican Basilica, of course unknown to the clergy; and sent a telegram of triumph to her husband at Geneva—*Communié Saint Pierre. Alleluia.* To do him justice, he blushed at her absurdities: '*je peux me plaindre de ma femme.*' On more than one occasion negotiations were set on foot at Rome for his rehabilitation. Leo XIII would have regularized his marriage by affiliating him to an Oriental rite in which a married clergy is recognized. But he insisted—he could not indeed have done otherwise—on his submission to

the Vatican Definition of 1870; and it was on this point that the proposals broke down.

He died February 9th, 1912. His life was one of failure, even of tragedy. But he was of the race of Precursors; and it may be said of him, in the words of a great and exceptionally enlightened director of souls, the Abbé Huvelin, '*Vous êtes de l'âme de l'Eglise.*' Nor are the labours of those who faint and fail by the way wasted.

> 'Others, I doubt not, if not we,
> The issue of our toils shall see;
> Young children gather as their own
> The harvest that the dead have sown,
> The dead forgotten and unknown.'

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND HISTORY

By Alban G. Widgery, Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Cambridge.

HOW are we to reconcile the historical process with the religious experience felt immediately? If the highest and truest relation to God is one of immediate communion with Him, what is the significance of the efforts and aims of history? Does the highest religious attitude necessitate the rejection of the values of human experience which are to be found in the daily life of all but the most unfortunate individuals? Has the idea of a progress of humanity in the course of history no place and meaning in religion? Are the goods of the body, of the intellect, of art, of morality, simply so many distractions from the contemplation and love of God? Or is it that in the pursuit of these goods, day by day, year by year, century by century, we are achieving at least something that is essential? Does the recognition of the immediacy of the communion with God in religious experience deprive the historical process of real value, or is it somehow possible to reconcile the two—to find in the experiences of time something of the substance of eternity?

Eastern, and especially Indian thought, has paid little attention to history. It may be doubted whether it has ever arrived at the conception of progress in a broadly social and

historical sense. The individual might perchance progress from life to life to the attainment of final redemption. But the facts of which the lives, and so history, are composed have only a passing significance. Certain forms of philosophical thought have considered the transitory events of time sufficiently to regard them as *lílá*, the sport of the divine mind. Eastern religions have stood for the principle that to attain to the bliss of religious experience the individual must give his attention to it. The result depends upon a proper attitude of mind: given that, the result may be attained here and now. Religious attainment has seemed to lie through asceticism and in the contemplation of the eternal. On the other hand, at the centre of Western thought and life is the conviction that the course of the world is in some degree moulded by the activities of men, and that in these activities in history the good is becoming known and achieved. At the first glance it appears that for the majority of mankind in the West there is no need to urge the importance of activity for the goods of earthly life. It is equally true that the majority see no religious significance in their pursuit. In fact, even in the West saints and other religious teachers have frequently preached against the world and its riches as opposed to the ultimate welfare of the soul. And it is evident that political activity, scientific research, or artistic endeavour might keep some minds from religious contemplation just as others are kept from it by pursuit of sensuous pleasures and ephemeral excitements. We are here in face of a problem of the greatest significance not only for our religious life, but also for our attitude and activities in general. It is a question whether there is a divorce between true religion and all the other values and pursuits of mankind, or, if not, how these values and pursuits are to be regarded in relation with religious ideals. Such questions raise a difficult problem of metaphysics, that of the relation of time to eternity, but this is not the place to enter into a metaphysical discussion of that problem. It must suffice for our purpose to contend that on the one hand in the activities of ordinary occupations men are sharers in temporal processes, and on the other in religious experience at least they seem to transcend time in an apprehension of the eternal.

Strive as men may to escape from the historical process, they always fail. The contemplative ascetic reduces the variety of his experiences: he shuts out many of the aspects of life and occupies his attention with ideas and thoughts—sometimes of God, sometimes of his own finite self, sometimes with the thought that even thought itself keeps him from complete union with God. Sometimes, perchance, he enjoys an experience of communion with God. But it might be asked whether cutting oneself off from duties and privileges of earthly life can be in accord with a belief that this world and this life are products of divine intelligence and will. Such a belief is not often genuinely accepted by those who set little or no worth on the historical process. In the East especially, the historical process, these changes in time, these values of daily life, these results of so much effort on our part, are regarded as delusions. It is legitimate to ask: Whose delusions? They can only be delusions suffered by some reality. The only reality usually acknowledged by those maintaining this view is the one universal consciousness, the Absolute. Consider for a moment the crux to which this leads. The only reality, the Absolute, is supposed to be perfect. But it must be the universal consciousness which is suffering the myriads of delusions called individual beings and the historical events which go to make up the lives of those beings. To realise communion with, or absorption with such an Absolute—or however else we might describe the religious experience in such case—would not be to transcend history; it would only be to enter (perhaps more fully) into the delusion of this deluded Absolute. Such forms of thought and such attitudes to life not only rob history and all it includes of real value and significance, they also fail to present an ideal or a type of experience which justifies mankind in scorning and neglecting the activities of history.

From the attitude which treats the historical as delusory one may turn to the conception which regards the historical alone as real. Just these constant changes, just this one thing after another, and so on for ever—life is nothing but that—constant struggle and constant change. All sorts of values as they come or are achieved, including types of religious experience, are to be enjoyed. To such a conception it may be said from the side

of religion that it has never been felt to be satisfying. Reality as a mere flux has occasionally been the thesis of philosophers; it has never been a doctrine of religion. Men not only desire and strive for the goods of daily life; they are also aware of a genuine need for permanent values, for enduring goods. The human spirit appreciates the variety and richness of experience, but it longs also for a sense of permanence and peace. Mankind has imagined a condition better than the passing show, sometimes as a Golden Age in the past or as a Heaven in the future.

The values of the historical life must be recognized and retained, and yet the desire for something permanent above change must be appreciated and satisfied. The historical process, with its discontent, the present events and efforts to attain a better condition, has somehow to be brought into harmony with the immediate experience of religious peace. Both sides must be acknowledged. The experience of change implies some kind of transcendence of it in the experient. The so-called passing values are not all merely passing: they have a character of duration. The difference between this duration and the permanence desired is only one of degree. For in earnest occupation in serious work, in the production or the contemplation of art, music, literature, and drama, in sincere moral actions, we are, as it were, out of a merely flowing movement in an eternal present which includes changes within its scope. In each particular experience as enjoyed there is a degree of satisfaction of the demand for the apprehension of the eternal. We believe that this is more definitely so when the activity is inspired with what might be called a religious motive. Those who pursue their vocations in life with a conviction that thus they are endeavouring to promote a divine purpose may be expected to, and indeed do, attain a more genuinely religious satisfaction than those who work simply to earn a livelihood, or achieve artistic production, or promote scientific research. If the historical has religious significance, then the fundamental motive of historical activities should be religious, whatever other motives there may be besides.[1]

[1] To forestall misrepresentation I would in this footnote say that this does not mean *e.g.* that the artist should generally occupy himself with

It is in a closer consideration of the attainment of values that we may get some help as to our main problem. Change is transcended even though one is at the same time aware of changes: the fact, that only by transcending change it is possible to know it, does not imply that change is not real. What it does signify is that spirit or soul is not simply a being of change. This transcendence is involved in so common an experience as the hearing and understanding of a sentence. The experience is not just of one sound and then another, and so on to the end of the sentence, each separate and cut off from the others. Although each sound, each word is separate, is individual, the meaning of the sentence is understood only by the capacity of the mind to grasp all the words together, as the expression of the judgment in the mind of the one who says the sentence. The same is true of the appreciation of a musical melody. Only because the notes are in some manner related together is the understanding and enjoyment of the melody possible. Human experience is not a series of unrelated moments of infinitesimal length, each like a knife edge. Each 'present,' each 'now' has length, duration. This experience of a *tout ensemble*, this synopsis, as it has been called is of fundamental importance in all fields of human life. And here it is interesting to note that the progress of the individual and of the wider historical whole is largely an advance in the capacity and opportunity to experience wider and richer values. A trained musical mind can understand and appreciate a great musical work as a whole: others may be able to grasp only short series of notes, melodies, and chords. The higher the capacity of the mind in any type of experience the broader its grasp. But this breadth does not do away with the individual factors, or the changes occurring within it. The progress through history should be sought in the increasing capacity of mankind to realise and to enjoy values of wider and wider range and greater duration. If we believe that the values

what have been called religious subjects; nor again that the scientist is to strive to justify particular religious beliefs by his research. The religious conception of the duty of the scientist is that he shall seek and teach the truth; and of the artist that he shall add to the beauty of life in every possible way.

striven for and in part experienced in history are in accordance with the purpose and significance of divine creation, then the increase in their realization and enjoyment is a coming into a richer and harmonious accord with Him. The attitude to the pursuit of values in history is affected by the impressions received in the religious experience of communion with God; but this latter is in its turn affected by the character of the person and the society in which he lives, as realized through historical effort. The comprehensiveness of the mind varies in particular ways with the course of development and progress. It is a definite moral advance when the merely personal good of the individual is subordinated to the greater good of the family; or that of the family to the wider good of humanity. History should be, and in part is, constituted by the efforts to achieve and to enjoy wider positions, a process by which a state of comprehensiveness is reached which will include the variety of daily experiences.

Often enough in the past it has been insisted that moral righteousness and purity of character are necessary for the full fruition of the religious life. As far as this goes it is fundamental, and it suggests something of the answer to the question of the significance of history in relation to religious experience. History is in part concerned with the development of the moral character needed for the true enjoyment of the religious experience. But this conception is often too limited. In the first place there has been a too individualistic interpretation, as though it is a question of merely personal moral development. A view of history which recognizes adequately the social evolution of morality, in the religious community and indeed in human societies generally, must insist that as far as the religious experience depends on the moral the individual is affected by the fact that we are 'members one of another' and are participators in a socio-historical process. In the second place, the conception is limited to the moral. The historical includes much more than moral experience, and to do justice to the idea of a divine significance in history, these other elements, *e.g.* the search for and attainment of truth, the production and enjoyment of art, must be considered to have a bearing on the character of the religious experience. It is not merely that the pure in heart shall

see God, but also that the truth shall make us free, and that the Lord is to be worshipped in the beauty of holiness. Development in all these directions makes mankind more able to enter into a worthy communion and co-operation with God. But that is not all. In accordance with our previous contention, mankind in the enjoyment of these values experience something of that transcendence of the merely transitory, something of that permanence and calm of attainment which constitutes religious fruition. The significance of history from the point of view of religion is thus not simply in an end to be achieved, but also in the character of some of the experiences which form the course of history.

The relation of the historical process to the immediate religious experience may be typified by a rough illustration. The historical process may be likened to a climb up a mountain rising gradually from an extensive plain, reaching on all sides to the horizon. The climber sets his gaze upwards, but also notices the beauties of the surrounding plain. The higher he goes, the fresher the air, the more invigorating the atmosphere, and the wider the outlook: and the more clear the summit. Even before he reaches the top he gains a certain inspiration by gazing in anticipation towards it. The religious experience is the gazing up to God. But there is this great difference, that the relation in religion is that of the intimacy of communion as personal. The closer to the top of the mountain—the further along the road of historical progress—the closer to God and at the same time a wider and fuller experience. The process of spiritual life is not simply forwards through history, but also 'inwards' or 'upwards'—and both lead to God. Not one but many are the climbers, and they all start from different points on the plain. As they mount higher they get closer and may interchange information as to the view and even as to the means of reaching the summit. So, as history goes on, the different sections of mankind seem to become (in spite of hindrances and conflicting tendencies) more and more inter-related, especially in the production of goods, physical, intellectual, artistic, moral and religious, country with country, west with east, south with north. There is now almost a world-wide exchange of all kinds of goods. These are, however, mostly of the plain and the

mountain side. What of the different views of the summit and the ways to attain to it, the religions? Here the signs of co-operation are few. The different peoples, ascending from different sides, have in the past too often thought that they alone could see the real summit. Nevertheless, there are signs that men will gradually acknowledge that each religion may possess some truths which others do not possess, or that some truths are seen in some religions more clearly than in others. They may come to the belief that some peoples have got nearer to the summit, even perchance that one religion is more comprehensive and true than all others.

The inadequacy of the foregoing illustration is apparent in many ways. It may, however, help to show in some degree that the answer to our main problem is that the pursuit of all goods of life aids in the approach to God; that the social co-operation by which these goods are achieved in history and a wider outlook attained is fundamental; that in that men transcend the mere changes of their experience they are able to gaze upwards and so enter into an immediate personal relation with God. True historical progress involves a mental development influencing the character of this relation. The more men progress the more fit they become to enter into a worthy relation to God. The religious experience, instead of ruling out the historical, demands it, and should be, as it often is, an inspiration to men in their historical endeavour.

IS THE GROUP-MIND PERSONAL?

By the Rev. JOHN H. BENTLEY, M.A., Secretary of the Churchmen's Union.

THIS paper is concerned with certain doctrines or assumptions relating to group-life in society: doctrines which *e.g.* are sometimes used to provide a philosophical basis for Guild Socialism—which Prof. Maitland and Dr. Figgis have propounded in recent years in justification of group or institutional independence of the State—which form the background of the group theory of religion as enunciated by M. Durkheim and his fellow-sociologists in *L'Année Sociologique*. The *fons et origo* of these doctrines, with their differing shades of colour, may be said to be the *Republic* of Plato; the dominant influence in modern times has been the philosophy of the German idealists, and particularly that of Hegel, which in England is seen in the teaching of the late Prof. T. H. Green and his followers, especially in Oxford, who have developed the idealist philosophy of the State. These men, from the side of philosophy, have shown the hollowness of the 'opposition' of the individual to the State, which the earlier doctrine of *laissez faire* with its intense individualism presupposed, and have taught us that the individual is dependent on the community for all that he has or is or can be, for his rights and liberty, for his worth and his moral development. Indeed, apart from the philosophers, for the last half-century the thought of nearly every branch of science has been increasingly directed towards society.

In the Introduction to his book, *The Group Mind*, published three years ago, Dr. William McDougall, in seeking support for the principle of a group mind, quotes largely from Dr. Ernest Barker's expositions of Mr. Bradley's well-known essay on *My Station and its Duties* and Mr. Bosanquet's treatise on *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, and we cannot do better than follow his example here. How do these writers explain the 'soul' of a nation or the mind of a group?

> 'What we call an individual man is what he is because of and by virtue of community . . . he is what he is by including in his essence the relations of the social State. . . . And regarding the State as a system, in which many spheres (the family, for instance) are subordinated to one sphere, and all the particular actions of individuals are subordinated to their various spheres, we may call it a moral

organism, a systematic whole informed by a common purpose or function. As such it has an outer side—a body of institutions; it has an inner side—a soul or spirit which sustains that body. And since it is a moral organism—since, that is to say, its parts are themselves conscious moral agents—that spirit resides in those parts and lives in their consciousness. In such an organism—and this is where it differs from an animal organism, and why we have to use the word moral—the parts are conscious: they know themselves in their position as parts of a whole, and they therefore know the whole of which they are parts. So far as they have such knowledge, and a will based upon it, so far is the moral organism self-conscious and self-willing; and this is what Hegel himself means by speaking of the State as a 'self-conscious' ethical substance, a 'self-knowing and self-actualizing individual.' The will and the knowledge are the will and the knowledge of persons, but of persons (1) who have as the content of their will the moral organism on its outer side, as a body of relations, and (2) who are aware of themselves as willing this content, and thereby constitute the moral organism on its inner side as the spirit of a nation. Thus, on the one hand, we must recognize that the State lives; that there is a nation's soul, self-conscious in its citizens; and that to each citizen this living soul assigns his field of accomplishment. Yet, on the other hand, we must recognize that individuals live, and live with all their fulness just when and just so much as they cultivate their specific field.'[1]

As for groups or permanent institutions within the State:

'All the institutions of a country, so far as they are effective, are not only products of thought and creations of mind: they *are* thought, and they *are* mind. Otherwise we have a building without a tenant and a body without a mind. An Oxford college is not a group of buildings, though common speech gives that name to such a group: it is a group of men. But it is not a group of men in the sense of a group of bodies in propinquity: it is a group of men in the sense of a group of minds. That group of minds, in virtue of the common substance of a uniting idea, is itself a group-mind. There is no group-mind existing apart from the minds of the members of the group; the group mind only exists in the minds of its members. But nevertheless it exists. There is a college mind, just as there is a Trade Union mind, or even a 'public mind' of the whole community; and we are all conscious of such a mind as something that exists in and along with the separate minds of the members, and over and above any sum of those minds created by mere addition.'[2]

Thus, in this view, an institution is an ethical idea, requiring a mind that entertains that idea, both as knowing it and willing it and striving to carry it out. The idea is the common substance of the minds of the members of the institution or group, existing only in their minds, yet existing as a common mind, a collective mind. This view is that of Dr. William McDougall. It must be distinguished from thoroughgoing Hegelianism, which in one form the Great War made popularly known as

[1] E. Barker, *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day* pp. 61 ff.

[2] E. Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

'the German view of the State,' attributing to the State (or more strictly in Hegel's teaching to the nation) a super-individual, semi-divine character, to which individuals must bow for their salvation; and which, in another form, is seen in the theory of Schaeffle and others (based on the analogy of the biological organism) of a super-individual 'collective consciousness,' a unitary consciousness of the group or of society comprising and somehow exceeding that of the individuals composing it. Dr. McDougall provisionally rules out this latter view; and, indeed, the analogy between the biological organism and a society must be defective: no continuity of substance exists in the members of a group as in an organism: there is 'no unitary brain-process in society as the physical correlate of the unitary stream of consciousness in the individual'; but even so, while we may still speak of a group-mind, it is doubtful whether the principle of a group-mind in any of the above senses is valid.

It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to give some reasons for this doubt. The thesis is (1) that the group-mind is not an entity in itself, separable from the socialized minds of individuals, and (2) that it is not, in an acceptable meaning of the word, 'personal.'

Dr. McDougall claims that his conception of a group-mind 'is useful and therefore valid'; but validity must surely depend on something more than mere utility. It is useful to speak of the sun rising and setting, but this does not make the doctrine of a flat earth valid. It may be useful to tell lies, but this cannot make lying true. In the milder theory before us it is admitted that the 'common mind' exists only *in* the minds of the members of a group; and at the outset it may be suggested that this admission carries with it the key to what the so-called 'common mind' may well be—for in the minds of the members is *thought*, 'the substance of a uniting idea,' as Mr. Bosanquet phrases it, and what is common is not the thinker, but what is thought. In ordinary speech, owing to the poverty of our language, we use the word 'mind' both for the seat of consciousness and for the content of consciousness. This distinction is of the greatest importance, and nothing but utter confusion can result from ignoring it. The confusion that does in fact result is comparable with that resulting in ethics from the two mean

ings of the word 'please' (*placet* and *amoenum est*—'I choose' and 'it gives me pleasure'). That which we 'share' with one another is the content of mind, or, rather, the contents of separate consciousnesses may resemble one another. The root of the fallacy seems to lie in 'misapplied spatial metaphor.' Dr. Rashdall in his lectures on *Philosophy and Religion* has shown how we tend to think of minds as being in space—regarding minds as capable of being parts of other minds, like Chinese boxes which fit one inside the other—the truth being that space is in mind and not mind in space. You cannot measure or weigh the mind of a man. My mind cannot be *in* yours. Every stage of the consciousness of each of us is unique. It is only the content of consciousness, the thing thought, that can be similar and, in our loose way of speaking, 'shared.' As Dr. R. M. McIver puts it in his sociological study, *Community*:

> 'Many hearts may beat as one, but the heart beats are still many. When we speak of the will or the mind or the sentiments of a community we mean no mystical will or mind or sentiments. We are speaking of the like willing or the like thinking or the like feeling of social beings. If I love and honour my country, it is the love and honour of a mind, of a unicentred spiritual being. But if a country loves and honours one of its members, that multicentred love and honour is a very different thing. He loves it as a unity, but it cannot as a unity love him in turn. . . . The community which he loves does not as such think or feel. It has no unitary mind or will or heart.'[3]

The truth is that it is only society in abstraction, society as a type, that can be thought of as having a 'common' mind; society as a concrete fact consists of beings, each with a separate mind, united for a common purpose. We may and do speak of John Bull's mind; but John Bull is only an abstraction, a common type, an idea; we cannot substantiate him and make him an *eidôlon*—something seen; and further, the bond that binds us to one another in John Bull is in varying degree *in* each of us and not something external to any of us: social relations are not so much between us as *in* us: human society is not coupled together like the carriages of a railway train. This is the reason why we cannot think of society as 'greater than the sum of its parts,' and why it is unsafe to call society an organism (as Dr. McDougall wisely sees) unless we qualify the term. The kingdom of heaven is within us, and so is the particular kingdom of earth, or institution, or group to which

[3] p. 83.

we belong. Society works within us, and corporately in broad metaphor social beings may act *like* an organism; but strictly speaking an organism, as the term is used in biology, is a closed system with a single centre of consciousness—and who will say what are the limits of personality, or set a fence to the living activity of community? We may speak metaphorically, and possibly hopefully, of 'organizing' the Churchmen's Union, but those who know it best will most readily agree that it will never become an organism like the human body, with one single centre in which is one single consciousness! If, therefore, we accept the term we must qualify it; if we accept Kant's definition of an organism as 'a whole of which the parts are reciprocally ends and means,' we must recognize that organism in this sense is true only of human society as a *moral* organism, and not as an 'organical structure' *made* by adding part to part; of human society which consists of free beings seeking self-realization—the development of personality—through the pursuit in their social relations of similar or identical ends, which are wider than the whole aggregate of human beings can conceive. We cannot sum up personalities in their relations to one another; we cannot dissect society any more than we can dissect mind, except in abstraction; we can find no adequate analoge for society, either in the multicellular organism of biology or elsewhere: it is *sui generis*. Dr. McIver says somewhere that community is 'communal,' and that this is the best and the only safe adjective to use. True, the mind of the individual responds to its environment, whether the environment be that of other minds or of the external world about us; we imitate, we sympathize, we love; we are both made by social environment and make it; we inherit traditions from the past, and can be *en rapport* with the living. The nation, the crowd, the group, the family—these are units, each with its own life, each capable of being viewed as a whole in itself; but 'if each man thinks and acts differently as a member of a crowd or association and as an individual standing out of any such immediate relation to his fellows, it is still *each* who thinks and acts.'

It is worth noting that the whole trend of the history of religions[4] supports this view. Religious experience, which is

[4] Cf. Prof. C. C. J. Webb, *Group Theories of Religion*, pp. 177 ff.

of all experiences 'the most concrete, in the sense of finding nothing in us or about us with which it is merely unconcerned,' requires the middle course between Nominalism on the one side and Pantheism on the other. Any doctrine of Atonement, for instance, is impossible to a nominalistic philosophy to which mutual exclusiveness (impermeability and impenetrability) is a necessary characteristic of individuality; on the other hand, doctrines like those of individual responsibility and the immortality of the individual soul—equally as fundamental as the doctrine of union or restored union with God—make inadmissable a Pantheism in which personal identity is lost. The religious mind must always revolt against any exaggeration of the individual factor in reality against the universal, and of the universal against the individual: it is opposed both to Solipsism and to Absolutism, and it must be so opposed because of its own concrete experience of reality in *personal* religion.

Applying this to our present subject, we find in it support for regarding individuality and sociality as *correlatives*, equally necessary to the growth of the personality of socialized beings; and we see that there is no *need* to postulate a 'general will' in the sense of an active principle in society—a mystical supra-social person like the guardian angel which in John Henry Newman's view guided the destiny of a society—to account for a group seeking an end over and above the separate smaller ends of the individuals who compose it. The individual impulses act in a social medium. Individual interests from the first point beyond to an interest in the whole. Particular modes of conduct contain from the first a universal element: the habits of the individual are, or become, the habits of a social being. It is not therefore necessary to assume the action of a 'will' in society other than the like willing of individuals.

> 'All that it is necessary to assume is that the will of the individual is a more complex thing than the older psychology was prepared to admit; that, underlying the ends which the individual sets before himself in a social world, there is a reference to a wider end than they commonly represent.'[5]

No doubt this is very controversial ground, but the theory of a 'collective mind' does seem an unnecessary and superfluous assumption to account for the phenomena of group-life. The

[5] J. H. Muirhead, *Social Purpose*, p. 87.

principle of the parsimony of causes (Occam's Razor) surely applies here : *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.* It does appear unthinkable that there can be any mind in a group which is anything but the socialized individual minds of the members of the group; that any mystical transcendental mind over and above the minds of the members can exist in these very minds; and still more unthinkable that it can exist outside them as an 'over-mind,' except, as religious philosophy leads us to believe, in God as Mind. Society is in very truth a complex system beyond the understanding of its members, but we *need* not postulate a communal mind to think the greater system or a communal will to think the Common Purpose. 'One Purpose, many Wills,' is the formula suggested by the present Bishop of Manchester.[6] We are linked together by a Common Purpose which none of us individually possesses, and are in our fellowship loyal to an ideal which not one of us, indeed not all of us, can completely formulate or fully understand; and so we believe in God—we reach the conception of a Spirit knowing and willing the *Summum Bonum.* This, for those who accept it, may well be the solution of the problem of the source and goal of the Common Purpose; for man is not social only : because he is social he is moral; the terms 'duty,' 'obligation,' and 'ought,' have no meaning apart from social relations : and social relations are meaningless apart from these terms; and the supreme moral ideal, the highest good of the whole world, must be conceived of as both thought and willed by God as Mind and Will.

And because the group-mind has this mark of purpose, I would not hesitate, if it were not ambiguous, to call it 'personal,' for purpose, involving morality, is the highest and distinctive mark of personality. It may justly be termed 'personal' because it *belongs* to men and women, and not to things; because, by however many twists and turnings, it does seek through personal agents love as its end—as the universal end —'till we all come . . . unto a perfect man.' But this, it will be said, is no adequate answer to the question which forms the title of this paper, which means, 'has the group-mind a personality of its *own*?' It is therefore necessary to add that in

[6] W. Temple, *The Nature of Personality*, p. 58.

any other sense than that of belonging to persons or of exhibiting marks of personality the adjective 'personal' must be withheld. The group-mind is not that of *a* person. If a number of persons construct by inter-relations an organization 'which can only be described in terms of mind,' it does not place this construction in the same order as the forces which constructed it; and similarly a group, a whole inclusive of units, does not belong to the same order as these units, 'any more than a constellation' (as Dr. F. R. Tennant has phrased it) 'is a star.'

And unless we evacuate the term 'person' of its normal meaning, this denial of personality must hold good also in the case of Prof. Maitland's doctrine as set forth in the Introduction to his translation of Gierke's works and by Dr. Figgis in *Churches in the Modern State*. This doctrine, if we may follow Dr. McDougall again in quoting Dr. Ernest Barker's summary, is briefly that:

> 'No permanent group, permanently organized for a durable object, can be regarded as a mere sum of persons, whose union, to have any rights and duties, must receive a legal confirmation. Permanent groups are themselves persons, group-persons, with a group-will of their own and a permanent character of their own; and they have become group-persons of themselves, without any "creative" act of the State. In a word, group-persons are real persons. and just because they are so, and possess such attributes of persons as will and character, they cannot have been made by the State. No external power can make a real person: a real person grows from within.'[7]

Here, however, we are confronted with 'juristic' personality, and not with *real* personality. An associational unity or corporation is to the law a person, and as a 'juristic' person it may be said to have grown and not to have been made by the State. The same principle may, or may not, be valid in the case of *any* group with a long history behind it, such as the Church or a Trade Union: such a group *is*, and the law may be said merely to recognize it as *being*; and accordingly it may as such a 'person' claim from the State a large measure of independence. But this is not *real* personality. Dr. Barker's caution leads him to remark, when criticizing this doctrine, that 'to talk of the real personality of anything other than the individual human being is to indulge in dubious and perhaps nebulous speech.' Those words seem to me to be the sum of the whole matter.

[7] *Political Thought . . . from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day*, p. 175.

BOOK REVIEWS

WHAT TO TEACH AND HOW TO TEACH IT

It will probably be admitted by the parents and teachers of to-day that one of their most pressing problems is that of the religious education of their children. What are they to teach in view of the new light that is being shed on old books—how are they to teach it? The second point sometimes seems the more perplexing. It is now comparatively easy for anyone who is anxious to know to find books written from the modern point of view—such are constantly being reviewed in these pages—but when one is faced with the giving of Bible lessons to children, or with the responsibility of a child's religious education, it is often difficult to know how to set about the task.

How often a child will ask us, 'Is it true?' At what age can he begin to distinguish between truth of fact and truth of idea? Is it right to tell stories that we know to contain an element of myth, before the child is old enough to be told that this is so? Many people who are aware of the harm that Old Testament teaching has done in the past feel very strongly that none should be given at all during school age. Others think that while nothing should be told to small children to give a wrong picture of God, the intelligent discussion of Old Testament difficulties is of value to boys and girls of ten years old and upwards, living as they do in a world largely based on Old Testament standards and ideals. If they have some real understanding of the Old Testament, it may make them more capable of recognising false ideas when they meet them, though it is equally true to say that they must have a standard, namely that of Jesus himself, by which to test them.

The question of miracles in the New Testament is a difficulty to some. A boy after hearing the story of the turning of the water into wine remarked, 'My father can do that sort of thing, he's a conjuror.' How shall we avoid giving this impression to our boys and girls.

We want our children to learn to pray, but anyone who has listened to the mechanical repetition of the Lord's Prayer that goes on in many of our day and Sunday schools, must wonder whether it is not in danger of becoming nothing more than an incantation. We must ask ourselves whether we will teach it at all to tiny children, whether it would not be infinitely better for them to 'discover' it for themselves as they grow older, when they need its phrases to express some experience of their own.

Ultimately each teacher must decide for himself what form the teaching shall take.

Although published in 1920, *Present-day Problems in Religious Teaching*, by Hetty Lee, remains one of the most valuable books at present available for teachers.[1] Its six chapters deal with the Gospel stories in the light of to-day, the Old Testament stories in the light of higher criticism, the problem of memory-work and modern educational methods, the problem of prayer and reverence in school life, the Christian method in education, and the child's unrealised universe. It does not solve all the problems some would wish to have solved, but it bears witness to the fact that it is written by a practical teacher, and many are finding that it points to the only lines along which these problems will be solved. Those teachers, who do not already know it, would be well advised to get it.

[1] *Present Day Problems in Religious Teaching.* By Hetty Lee. (Macmillans; 3/6.)

In view of one or two illustrations it contains from the older day school syllabuses, it is interesting to compare these with that issued recently by the Diocese of St. Albans.[2] The syllabus is supplemented by two pamphlets, one of 'General Observation,' the other addressed to the clergy, parents, and teachers, and written by the Bishop of the Diocese. The syllabus itself is based on some execellent lesson books, and included suggestions for individual work for both the older and the younger scholars. It allows a great measure of freedom to the teacher, and gives general headings for the teaching, rather than particular details. The following quotations from the syllabus and the two pamphlets will give some indication of the lines on which it is drawn up.

In the Infant's Syllabus we find:

(1) 'We shall do well to remember that God forces himself on no one, and possibly most cases of young children failing to feel the presence of God are due to their not wanting to do so. Such cases may usually arise from someone having given the child a wrong conception of God, as a God of Anger, Whom they fear. No stories showing such a conception of God should be told to the children, until they reach a later stage, when they can understand how the stories came to be written, and can distinguish between the imperfect revelations of God shown by the prophets and the seekers of all ages, and the perfect revelation of Christ. For this reason, such stories as those of the Flood, the Tower of Babel, etc., are omitted.'

(2) 'When children are in the presence of a loved person, they naturally spontaneously talk to him. So prayer is the natural outcome of consciousness of the loving presence of God. (*a*) The child will want to talk of all his interests and joys. The easiest prayers are therefore mainly in the nature of praise and thanksgiving for home, friends, the beauties of the world, etc. (*b*) Two of the requests most commonly on the lips of small children are: "Let me help," and "Let me do it." The children's *petition* will, therefore, largely be connected with the desire to serve. The children will learn about prayer from praying, rather than from formal lessons on prayer.'

(3) 'If we wish to teach "giving, not getting," as the aim of Christian life, we must be careful never to set our children a double standard. The question of rewards and prizes will have to be considered. It would seem that it is better to "beat your own best" rather than to "beat your brother."'

(4) The Bishop, in his pamphlet, says: 'I have no sort of doubt myself that one of the main reasons why so much of our religious teaching has been ineffective, or worse, in producing believing and practical Christions, is the too early and the unintelligent teaching of the Old Testament. Wrong ideas of God and man, and of the relation of nation to nation, have thus been impressed on the child's mind.'

(5) 'Emphasize the joyous side of Christianity, the Church touching all life—sport, amusement, agriculture, arts and crafts, fun and laughter—as well as the serious side of life . . . thereby tending to cancel the fatal distinction between the sacred and secular; and thus consecrating all life.'

The list of books suggested for the use of teachers, though not comprehensive, is good, with the exception of one or two under the Prayer Book heading. In that section teachers will probably find *The Way of Worship*, and *From Baptism to Holy Communion* most helpful

[2] *Syllabus for Religious Instruction in the Diocese of St. Albans. General Observations and Pamphlet.* (Richardson's, 5 High Street, St. Albans; 1/-.)

for lesson preparation as apart from historical study. The recommendation of additional books on spiritual healing—and psychology—would be of value.

This syllabus will be of use to all parents and teachers who need guidance or wish to know where to obtain lesson books, hymns and pictures for their children.

M. W.

CHRISTIAN UNITY.*

So much more or less false and florid rhetoric has been expended over this subject of Christian unity, that the long-suffering reviewer gets into the habit of discounting the verbiage, and just looking to see exactly what the writer does say on the one or two crucial points which are of genuine importance. Generally he finds that these are delicately evaded; or else the writer, just when he seems on the point of saying something sensible, takes fright and refuses the fence.

Applying this test to the present volume, we turn to the chapter entitled, 'The Church—Its Faith.' Here we find an interesting distinction drawn between 'A statement of belief held to be necessary to the unity of the Church, and the baptismal oath or confession.' It is said that 'to demand subscription to a full statement of the Church's faith before Baptism, is to expect the babe to be as wise as its parents. The creed is the statement of faith held by the universal body, and has no reference to the individual on his coming into the Church.' What the convert originally did was to swear personal allegiance to Jesus as Lord, 'and to substitute for this an intellectual test is not gain but loss—in fact it is to rob conversion of its real meaning.'

Now we gladly admit that here Principal Robinson does say something quite plain and quite sensible; yet we doubt if his position is permanently tenable. If (as he suggests) the *shema*—'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,' etc.—is to be a sufficient baptismal declaration, it will have to be a sufficient test of church membership, which is not far from saying that it will be the church's creed. A very good creed, no doubt; but one which few Jews would refuse to repeat, and where are we then?

Our author will, we fear, be forced by logic either to climb down to the position of conventional creed-worship, or to ascend into a freer air where creeds are seen in their true proportions. As it is, he hangs precariously between heaven and hell.

Principal Robinson has dealt with the problems of the Ministry and Sacraments more or less on the lines familiar to liberal catholics. The priesthood is representative (a view admitted theoretically even in the Roman Church), and sacraments are symbols. There is nothing whatever to object to here. Yet there is no getting over the fact that what he means by minister and sacrament is something quite different from what the traditionalist school means by them; and for ourselves we are all for perfectly plain statements, lest we be overwhelmed in the catastrophe which is clearly threatening those whom we are uselessly trying to placate. Yet this book is far more outspoken than most which are written on the subject, and the writer is not living in an entirely artificial world. We could wish that the book had been written by an Anglican, but perhaps that would be too much to expect.

* *Essays on Christian Unity.* By William Robinson, M.A., B.Sc. (James Clarke and Co., 1923; 6/- net.)

RESISTING THE INEVITABLE.*

'The moving finger writes, and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all thy piety and wit
Can lure it back to cancel half a line.'

Fitzgerald, or Omar, was right. Not even rhetoric, more powerful in a democratic age and country than piety and wit, can stay the hand of fate. Dr. Machen does indeed do his best:

> 'A terrible crisis unquestionably has arisen in the Church. In the ministry of evangelical churches are to be found hosts of those who reject the gospel of Christ. By the equivocal use of traditional phrases, by the representation of differences of opinion as if they were differences about interpretation of the Bible, entrance into the Church was secured for those who are hostile to the very foundations of the faith.'

Here we have the genuine touch, the *eloquentiae satis sapientiae parum* of Sallust. The same ideas are entertained, or rather, the same words are repeated, on this side of the Atlantic, and we know them too well. Such homilies, full of declamation and irrelevance, are not calculated to affect the realities of the situation. Yet something must be excused in those who bravely plead a lost cause; their rancour is intelligible, even though their ignorance is appalling. Yet it would seem that the zeal of these crusaders boils higher in America than in England. Can it be that owing to the lower standard of general education they have more public support?

J. C. H.

A STUDY IN ETHICS.**

'To furnish a comprehensive ethics for students in a church college' is the purpose of this volume. It seems to have been admirably fulfilled. The discussion has an historical background; that is to say, the author is not satisfied with *a priori* theorising or dogmatising; he indicates the sources of ideas, which is often a great help in estimating their value.

The book deals with a variety of topics ranging from Behaviourism to Internationalism; the practical range of ethical theory is pretty wide; in fact, the world is the ethical philosopher's domain; especially where he is teaching the young, who often see the world in terms of concrete practical ethical problems.

The utility of the book is enhanced by an admirable bibliography at the end of each chapter. In England this book might serve as a good *pièce de resistance* for a philosophically minded sixth form, or as a basis for discussion at a study circle organised by a clergyman anxious to promote serious thought among young people. The tone of the book is thoroughly idealistic, and, in the best sense, Christian.

* *Christianity and Liberalism.* By J. Gresham Machen, D.D. (The Macmillan Co., New York.)

** *Freedom and Christian Conduct.* By John A. W. Haas. (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1923.)

THE SUPERNORMAL.*

This book serves as a good example of the genuinely scientific work now being done by psychologists to reduce to some kind of order the manifold new facts revealed by recent researches into the *arcana* of human mentality. The axiom upon which their work is based is that even here, amidst so much apparent confusion, orderly regularities can be discovered by those who patiently look for them, which, when detected, can be summarised in formulae which are termed 'Laws of Nature.'

The work deals chiefly with the phenomena of what is known as 'supernormal cognition,' *i.e.* telepathy, second-sight, and so forth. It is, says the author, 'an entirely original study of personal experiment, independent of reading, and conducted without intentional reference to any influence but that of the observed facts.' Of these facts there is certainly a very impressive collection; and though about their interpretation there may be room for some differences of opinion, about their *existence* there can hardly be any at all.

Whether the majority of psychologists would accept Dr. Osty's obscure hypothesis that these phenomena are to be considered as 'the product of an unconscious psychic collaboration on various planes between cogniser and cognised' is perhaps doubtful. Yet hypotheses have to be put forward, and so long as they are clearly understood to be provisional only, every new hypothesis may serve to explore some possibility.

Space forbids our supplying a number of the interesting instances of precognition collected by Dr. Osty. A prevision was given to Dr. Osty himself in March, 1911:

> 'Take care, you will soon have a serious accident . . . I hear a violent shock . . . a loud noise . . . you will be very near death . . . what luck! you will take no hurt! I see a man bleeding on the ground; he is moaning, and all around him some things are strewn, I can't say what.'
>
> 'In August of the same year,' writes the author, 'I was going at an easy pace in my car when a drunken baker, driving furiously, pulled the wrong rein and collided. The shock was so great that the shafts, which struck the frame of the front glass, were shivered to pieces, and one wheel mounted the bonnet and crushed it in. My friend and I were stricken with amaze at the suddenness of the accident and our good fortune in being unhurt. Turning round we saw the horse galloping off, the cart in the ditch, wheels uppermost, and the baker stretched moaning and bleeding in the middle of the road with a number of loaves scattered around him.' (p. 175.)

Again, the author, in 1916, was given fairly accurate details, by a metagnomic subject in Paris, of the field hospital and the lodgings he would be accommodated in when he had arrived at the front. In fact it would appear (p. 183) that precognition of *general events* is a rarity of which there are very few unquestionable cases cited; whereas foreknowledge of *individual conditions* produced by external causes 'is as frequent as one may like to make the experiment.'

Mr. De Brath has done a most useful piece of work (and, may we add? done it admirably) in bringing Dr. Eugene Osty's researches before the English-reading public.

J. C. H.

* *Supernormal Faculties in Man.* By Dr. Eugene Osty, translated by S. De Brath. (Methuen, 1923; 15/- net.)

FRANCO-BRITISH CHRISTIANITY.*

Since the Armistice there has been a strong tendency among the younger Anglo-Catholic clergy to substitute Continental ceremonies and methods of devotion for English customs. Mr. Rawlinson and Fr. Wilfred Knox have been among the most able leaders in this movement in the English Church. Mr. Rawlinson apparently was introduced 'to Catholic principles,' if not to religion, by 'reading the great writers of the Church in France.' Fr. Knox, although he does not tell us where he learnt his faith, bemoans 'the insularity of outlook which has since the sixteenth century been the curse of English religion.' It is therefore not surprising to discover that our authors desire first and foremost to 'end the disastrous breach between England and the chief Bishop of the Christian Church.' 'There is nothing,' writes Fr. Knox, 'that lies so near to the heart of English Catholics as the hope of Re-union with the rest of Western Catholicism.' And Mr. Rawlinson, although he cannot 'yield all that Rome asks,' is 'eagerly longing for re-union' with the See of Peter. Yet there are hindrances in the way of this desired end. The chief obstacle being the 'predominance of the non-Catholic points of view in the highest quarters of the English Church.' Of lesser importance, according to Fr. Knox, are such questions as the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady, Transubstantiation ('which very few English Catholics would be prepared to make a ground for the perpetuation of the divisions of Christendom'), the celibacy of the clergy and the 'giving of Holy Communion to the faithful only in one kind.' Fr. Knox's list appears to miss the real objection to Re-union with Rome (*i.e.* that the religion of even Anglicans like Fr. Knox differs fundamentally from the religion of Rome. Rome does not base her religion, as does Fr. Knox, on the fact that the Sacraments work, but on the Petrine claim).

Although our authors seem to prefer the religion of France to that of Britain, yet they are willing, for the present, to throw in a little British tolerance, with French Catholicism. Mr. Rawlinson would not expell a Modernist Dean from his position, because 'it would close the ears of many to our message, through dislike of our methods.' But toleration is only for a time. Speaking of the modern tendency to allow different interpretations of Christianity within the National Church—the good Father of the Cambridge Oratory can write—'Such a view would concede to Catholics a wide measure of liberty, while allowing an equal measure of liberty to other points of view. It is quite impossible for Catholics to agree to such a conception of the functions of the Church.' One gathers that in the English Church of the future, only the Anglo-Catholic party will be allowed to exist. We shall no doubt be told that these are the views of an extremist. This may be so, but Mr. Rawlinson warns us 'that the moderates are soon swept away by the extremists' in any revolution. We agree. It is therefore advisable for Broad Churchmen to take warning while it is day. 'The night cometh when no man can work.'

We cannot here do justice to the excellent articles on varied religious topics with which their authors deal, especially those on mysticism by Mr. Rawlinson, and on what Fr. Knox believes to be 'The Catholic Conception of Christianity.' With much in these volumes we find ourselves in agreement, but the aims of the authors we cannot agree with, nor do we feel that they really understand the mind either of the Church of Rome or of the Church of England.

B. B.

* *An Anglo-Catholic's Thoughts on Religion.* By G. C. Rawlinson. (Longmans; 7/6.)
The Catholic Movement in the Church of England. By W. L. Knox. (Allan and Co.; 8/6.)

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT ANTITHESES.*

Perhaps the most attractive feature of this attractive volume is the author's transparent desire to achieve reality of thought and speech. In setting forth what appear to him to be the opposing characteristics of the Catholic and Protestant outlooks, Canon Quick makes his antitheses as decisive and clear-cut as possible, but this emphasis on points of difference is made invariably in the intersts of clear thinking, and a tendency to isolate and to oppose is seen as the necessary stage in the achievement of an ultimate synthesis and reconciliation.

The book is refreshingly free from the spirit of the partisan and the special pleader, while at the same time the desire for cold impartiality and even-handed justice is not allowed to destroy the human interest of detecting the author's personal preferences and predilections. The pronouncements of the mere neutral are as irritating to the reader with likes and dislikes of his own as to the hostess who has taken pains to provide attractive fare the bluff assurances of an undiscriminating guest that he cannot distinguish between beef and mutton.

But if we know where the author's sympathies are most readily given, there is no hint of that tendency, so common in apologetic literature of all types, to vilify an opponent, and to emphasize however unconsciously the strong points of your own case. Never for a moment does Canon Quick descend to the sorry device of setting ideal Catholicism over against actual Protestantism, or *vice versa*. In all cases ideals are contrasted with ideals, actualities with actualities. And in consequence the book is a really valuable contribution to the appreciation of outstanding differences, and where a synthesis is effected the reconciliation is based not upon a polite blurring of opposing view-points, nor upon a merely artificial bringing together of radically divergent tendencies of religious thought. Wherever obtained, the synthesis is the fruit of hard and constant thinking, the outcome of fearless definition coupled with a no less resolute determination to penetrate beneath superficial oppositions to the essential unity of outlook which results from a common participation in the spirit of the one Christ.

If the book admittedly abounds in sweeping generalisations and challenging paradoxes, the former are never irritatingly dogmatic, nor the latter the merely barren fruit of a nimble intellect. And the author's faculty for the clear arrangement of material, his genuine gift of illuminating epigram, his frequent felicity of phrase, encourage the reader to grapple strenuously with the carefully formulated arguments which the book presents.

The five chapters set forth for our examination, five clearly defined antitheses of Protestant and Catholic thought, under the headings of the Historic Faith, the Doctrine of Sacraments, Religious Consciousness, (Knowledge), Religious Consciousness (Desire) and the Kingdom of God.

It is shown that where the Catholic makes much of the doctrine of development and of the importance of corporate fellowship within the one Church, the Protestant (in reaction from the abuses of Catholic exaggeration) tends rather to stress the primary significance of Christian origins as the norm and necesary corrective of all later developments, while allowing to the individual a position of independence which (theoretically at any rate) gives full scope for the exercise of initiative and prophetic originality, as against the Catholic tendency to coercive government in the interests of

* *Catholic and Protestant Elements in Christianity.* By Oliver Chase Quick, M.A. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1924; 6/- net.)

uninspired mediocrity. While it appears that Canon Quick proves his case overwhelmingly with reference to the dangers which must result from an over-emphasis upon the claims of the individual, he is perhaps scarcely fair to the Liberal Protestant, whom he accuses of being false to New Testament Christianity inasmuch as he tends to look back rather than forward, and to concentrate attention solely upon Christ's human life. Canon Quick himself admits that the Protestant is right in insisting upon an ultimate reference of all later developments back to the historic ministry of Jesus, but to speak as though for any school of Protestants, however 'Liberal,' the Cross were the end of the story, is surely unjustifiable. Nor should the difficulties of the Liberal critic with respect to the Empty Tomb be airily dismissed on the ground that those difficulties imply a set of presuppositions foreign to the mind of St. Paul. In the last resort what matters is not whether the presuppositions of the modern man are or are not at variance with the thought of an earlier day, but rather whether earlier or later thought stands nearer to ultimate truth.

In writing of Sacraments, Canon Quick defends his boldness of speech by the assertion (amply justified) that 'in spite of all that is said to the contrary, it is confusion, not definition, which is the chief enemy of peace.' The Catholic view of Sacraments is summarised as 'Effective' or 'Institutional', as against the Protestant contention that they may best be regarded as 'Declaratory' or 'Symbolic.' The author would be the first to admit that the distinction here made is neither rigid nor final. But none the less it is valuable for purposes of discussion, and Canon Quick draws out the significance of the two contrasted view-points in their bearing upon the attitude of the two parties towards in the first place sacramental usage and doctrine, and in the second place the larger question of Reunion, seeking to justify the Catholic emphasis on outward uniformity as the pledge and condition of that inward unity of spirit which must be the ultimate goal.

The most difficult part of the book is undoubtedly that which treats of the relative positions of Knowledge, Desire, and action in the Christian life. Must we say with the Protestant that in all cases consciousness must come first, that a man must know truly and desire rightly before he can act in the way he ought to act? Or should we affirm rather with the Catholic that action must be the first step towards a true knowledge and a lofty aim? Do we, that is to say, act because we know the truth and because we desire it? Or must we first perform certain outward duties (as a matter of discipline, and at the bidding of an external, legal authority) in order that the corresponding inward states of knowledge and desire may be thereby developed? While Catholicism hastened to insist on conduct as a matter of external conformity, and so to rest content with a religious consciousness but imperfectly developed, Protestantism has been inclined rather, owing to an undue emphasis upon a particular and uniform type of religious experience, to paint in colours unduly sombre the lives of all those by whom that experience has not yet been attained. Protestantism has been wrong in its doctrine of a world fundamentally evil (since, as the Catholic asserts, man's primary instinct is for God, and the ultimate test of his desires is not what he thinks he wants, but that which brings him final and ultimate satisfaction when attained) but gloriously right in its refusal, in the supposed interests of outward conformity, to be satisfied with a relatively low level of conduct on the part of the majority.

Finally, in his interpretation of the true significance of the Kingdom of God the Catholic, it is asserted (and we most cordially agree) stands in

the main nearer to the essential truth of Christianity than the Protestant, inasmuch as while Protestant other-worldliness can claim support from the letter of primitive Christian teaching, with its background of apocalyptic imagery, its emphasis on two worlds, its clear-cut distinction between 'there' and 'here,' 'then' and 'now,' the Catholic, strong in his determination to win the whole of human life for Christ, is the bearer of a social gospel of far-reaching implications. While the Papacy was doubtless mistaken in its methods, its conception of a social order dominated by Christian principles can never be relinquished without serious loss. And Protestant thought at the Reformation, as Canon Quick is careful to point out, represents a definite swing back towards a less Christian view of human society and corporate relationships. The disastrous tendency, so markedly apparent in modern life, to make of religion merely one of a number of departments of human activity, and so to allow Industry, Commerce, Art, or what you will, to develop independently of religious sanctions, is the *damnosa hereditas* of a Protestantism which, by underrating the potential worth and goodness of the ordinary man, allowed the paganising of social and industrial life to go forward almost unchecked until the rise of the pioneers of Christian Socialism in the middle of the last century.

W. M. PRYKE.

THE FOUUNTAIN OF LIFE.*

It is exceedingly difficult for modern-minded pastors to find suitable manuals dealing with Holy Communion to give to their Confirmation candidates. There are any number of manuals published, which, if one could believe that Christ actually at a certain moment in the Communion Service entered into the Sacrament on the Altar, and at a later stage in that service entered into the heart of the faithful communicant, would be immensely helpful. But for those to whom such a faith is impossible and incredible there exist only a certain number of rather dull old-fashioned manuals which are of little use to young people. Mr. Buller's *Fountain of Life* is an attempt to produce something more suitable. It is concise, Scriptural, English, and pleasant in its *format*. H. D. A. M.

* *The Fountain of Life*. By H. M. BULLER, M.A., late Assistant Master in Clifton College, with a Foreword by the Right Rev. H. M. Burge, D.D. (S.P.C.K., 1924; 1/-; cloth gilt, 1/6.)

CORRESPONDENCE

THE DIMINISHING CLERGY.

SIR,

After your remarks on the diminishing clergy in the March issue, may I, as an ordinand of the diminishing class, be allowed to offer the following remarks upon the subject? The reason why so few public school men are attracted to the ministry is because of the low standard, not only of theological knowledge, but also of general culture required of ordinands in recent years. The younger clergy, in the parishes, are fast becoming an ignorant and uncultured body of men. Although a liberal catholic myself, I cannot but see that the Anglo-Catholic party, perhaps unwittingly, is largely responsible for this state of affairs. The largest of the theological colleges is Anglo-Catholic and most of its students are non-

graduates. They have, for the most part, a strong sense of vocation, but that, though the chief, is not the only requirement or there might be no difficulty in obtaining a supply of candidates at all. It is possible, according to ex-students of the college in question, to pass the required examinations solely by reading up notes taken at dictation, without even doing any independent reading.

The training provided by the training schools attached to monastic houses, though more severe than that already mentioned, is scarcely a preparation for clerical life in the Church of England. If it were merely a question of administering quasi-magical sacraments and saying endless rounds of services it would be excellent. The products of the institutions of both these types have not had either the education or the upbringing necessary to give them a large outlook upon their ministerial life before they enter these institutions, and their subsequent narrow training has in many cases reduced that outlook.

This is not to say that all the Anglican clergy should be drawn from one class—but have they ever been? Once there was a time when the Church afforded the only career for a poor man of humble birth, but educated. But this is a far different thing from ordaining men of quite ordinary ability and practically no education, in such numbers as to form the bulk of the ordinands. The man of means, culture, and education cannot hope to realize *his* vocation among such colleagues.

OXFORD ORDINAND.

TROELTSCH AND POLYMORPHOUS TRUTH.

SIR,

The reviewer of Troeltsch's *Christian Thought* in your March number speaks of the epithet 'polymorphous,' applied to the conception of truth (and not only of *religious* truth) entertained by Troeltsch in the last years of his life, as though it was invented to describe it by Baron von Hügel. As a matter of fact, it was Troeltsch's own.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

OXFORD.
March 18th, 1924.

THE PRESENT SITUATION.

SIR,

The broad facts of the present situation are these:

1. The masses in every nation, including the so-called educated classes, have no real religion. I do not mean in the sense of creed (though they positively disbelieve most of the clauses in the creeds) but they have no sense of Divine direction or of the reality of the soul. Christianity has become a system of highly debateable beliefs and tenets.

2. Textual critics have established the composite character of the Scriptures, and while performing this useful service of making the old childish literalisms impossible to educated minds, they have enormously diminished the authority of the Scriptures, for they have not taught men how to distinguish the local form from the spiritual content.

3. Had the Churches shown that the miraculous legends of the Old Testament are the *representation* of spiritual realities *according to the ideas of the time*, their work would have been a step forward in spiritual growth. But they have not done so, and the result on the masses has

been to produce a contempt for the Bible: it is identified not with the high spiritual perception that pervades it from cover to cover, but with false 'miracles.' Of the historical aspect revealing the laws of Spiritual Consequence, they have no sense whatsoever.

4. The first step in religious disintegration has been taken—the growth of an esoteric doctrine or mode of interpretation only comprehensible by the highly educated, as distinct from the exoteric statements still given to the masses. Those masses are quite educated enough to disbelieve such statements entirely, and openly accuse the clergy of teaching what they do not believe. The discussion between Cotta the Pontifex Maximus, Velleius the Epicurean and Balbus the Stoic narrated by Cicero might have taken place yesterday. The net result is that Our Lord's criterion of Christianity—'By this shall men know that ye are My disciples, that ye love one another' has scarcely any place in national and international politics.

5. Hence it comes to pass that hatreds are rife—between sections, parties, classes, and nations. These hatreds produce an atmosphere of perfectly well-grounded fear, which materialises in armaments—some of a new, invisible, and most terrible kind—which are making field-artillery obsolete. Immense chemical industries that can instantly be applied to the production of poison-gas are established. Germany has several factories for obtaining nitrogen from the air, and ten of these can produce 550,000 tons of cyanamide per annum, and can be instantly mobilised for a like amount of poison-gas. Sir Henry Wilson and Marshall Foch in their prefaces to Major Lefebure's book on Chemical Warfare have warned the public of what this implies. Sir Oliver Lodge has recently made it his text. Edison has predicted the consequences. But the nation is much too busy with races and betting and party politics to care.

The only remedy for this state of things lies in Christ's declaration—Μετανοεῖτε, change your outlook, change your hearts. This change of heart can only come in the way that He showed, by the works of power which prove to our dull eyes the real existence of a supersensuous world. Revivification of Religion can only come by a restored belief in the supernatural. I use that antiquated term advisedly, while fully admitting that in a philosophic sense there is no supernatural, as all physical and psychic phenomena and all spiritual causes are within Nature and under Law. But popular and quite sane use of the word means 'superior to physical Nature.'

Men of science can show that there is a scientific approach to Religion deducible from Astronomy, the higher Physics, Biology and Psychology—but this will not touch the greatest need of to-day—a conviction in the mass of mankind that truly there is a God Who judges the earth, not by phenomenal interventions, but by constant and invariable aid to those who by well-doing seek Him, but also by the equally invariable and inexorable Law of Spiritual Consequence, whereby deterioration of character works out in dissensions, weakness, and war.

Quem deus vult perdere prius dementat was the Roman interpretation: our God destroys none, whether by deluge or conflagration, but He will let the ruthless laws of spiritual evolution work out to their appointed end for those who choose to destroy themselves, for they are His law for dealing with evil.

Meanwhile orthodox science sets aside those weak things which are destined to confound the wise as they did in the first centuries of our era, and invents the most ghastly machines for the destruction of Western civilization.

I am no pessimist, for I believe heartily that 'somehow good will be the final goal of ill.' I believe even that this is the best world possible under material conditions, in the sense that it is the best that men will permit of its being. The natural forces are all right in spite of the nonsense about earthquakes and disease, and if men were truthful, honest, industrious and high-minded, the 'evils' in it are no more than necessary stimulants to progress. But I try to see things as they are, and I feel sure that unless we take advantage of the new knowledge confirming and explaining the old, we are destined to go through trouble which will make the late war seem a small thing.

Wallace was led by the metapsychic facts and by his biological knowledge to perceive that Evolution has a purpose—the development of a spiritual being. That is entirely conformable to the precepts of Christ. It solves the so-called Problem of Evil by defining evil as that which opposes the spiritual evolution. If that is the human evolutionary law, we may be certain that nothing can turn it from its course. We shall be weighed in the eternal balances and if found wanting shall be swept out of the way like the Assyrian.

The impending peril is not merely the destruction of cities, but the collapse of European civilization by the quadrupling of the fiscal distress we now endure, by the total stagnation of trade and general unemployment. Its prevention depends not on any refined theological explanations and dogmatic reconciliations, but on the practical recognition of principles long theoretically admitted as Christian.

Spiritual laws are not commandments, they are inherent principles in Nature. The first is Truthfulness—'Let your yea *be* yea, and your nay, nay: whatsoever is more than this cometh of evil.' Hence an end of all the one-sided perversions of party politics. One politician in opposition, talking to his gallery, says that 'no man is worth more than £500 a year.' In office he accepts £5,000, 'because it is the Trade Union rate for Ministers'! I don't blame him for accepting the salary, but for the previous stupid lie. Compare the present speeches of politicians with those of the same men a few years ago. Look at the enormous concourse of people and motor-cars at any race meeting and the vast sums spent on betting, drink, and enjoyment. Why, if they *really* wished to settle unemployment and trade difficulties there is ample money available to do it. What a transformation of politics and trade would result if men were simply truthful, would say what they mean and mean what they say!

The second is Industry. 'Whatever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.' This would involve the total abandonment of the idiotic policy of limitation of output that raises prices all round. Not long ago the manager of a large factory told me that he could raise wages thirty per cent. and reduce hours to seven if the men would only work while they are at work. And so on and so forth. All these things make for anger, opposition, and class enmity.

The real recognition of soul-development as the purpose of life means the conviction that no gain is worth crooked dealing.

This purpose of life should be taught in every school, not of course from the point of view of the supernormal phenomena, but from that of a Christian, instead of the baby theology and false history which is still current. It is a mockery to pray in our churches: Give peace in our time O Lord; useless to set up the name of Christ unless we act on His principles—I do not mean the socialist and pacifist travesty of them. We do not promote the cause of peace by pretending that things are other

than they are. Fine words do not delude any of those who are bent on our destruction, of whom there are many.

The continued life of the soul is of the essence of Christianity: 'If in this life only we have hope in Christ we are of all men most miserable.' That life of the soul has been demonstrated to this generation deprived of that conviction by materialistic science. Its faculties, independent of Time and Space, show that we *are* souls and *have* bodies. The body lives in Time, the soul in eternity, not in the future but in the present. Eternity is not boundless time, it is a state in which Time is replaced by the fulness of life. Duration is incidental to that fulness, and the faculties which so puzzle us are simply due to the fact that in that state Consciousness brings all things to the eternal Now.

It is time we gave less thought to the image of the Crucified and to a Redemption which is mythical unless we do our part to comply with its conditions, and more to the majestic Figure of the Living Christ who claimed—'All authority is given Me in heaven and on earth,' who spoke to St. John in Patmos with the voice as of many waters, and declared that He would rule the nations with a rod of iron, breaking them in pieces like a potter's vessel. That is taking place now as in the fourth century, by the operation of the invincible Law of Spiritual Consequence. For the operation of that Law is the rod that shatters—it is not an act of will by Him who is the same Mercy and Love yesterday, to-day, and for ever: that is only dramatic representation to express the transcendent verity that every act launched upon the world produces its inevitable results, and by those results men must learn, and will learn, the true course of human evolution towards the New Era of peace that they desire, and must find the paths that lead to the new heavens and the new earth *wherein dwelleth righteousness*. The New Era must assuredly come, but the choice is still before mankind to attain it through the furnace of affliction, or by the ways of that Divine Wisdom of whom it was said that her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace.

STANLEY DE BRATH.

THE MODERNISM OF BYRON.

SIR,

Byron, the centenary of whose death is being celebrated this month, was a rebel as concerning the Christian teaching prevalent in England in his day; and perhaps Modernists may regard him as little akin to them in thought. Yet I venture to think that, if he had been able to criticize the Bible as people are privileged to do to-day, he would have been a Modernist. I base this suggestion upon the following lines in *Childe Harold* (Canto iv):

> 'Yet let us ponder boldly—'tis a base
> Abandonment of reason to resign
> Our right of thought—our last and only place
> Of refuge; this, at least, shall still be mine:
> Though from our birth the Faculty divine
> Is chained and tortured—cabined, cribbed, confined,
> And bred in darkness, lest the Truth should shine
> Too brightly on the unprepared mind.'

GEORGE A. BYRON.

ADMIRALTY HOUSE,
LEWES.
April 6th, 1924.